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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment in favor of Respondent, Four Rivers Packing Co. 
("Four Rivers") and against Appellant Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. ("Panike"). Panike is a grower 
of onions. Four Rivers contracted to purchase 25,000 hundredweight of field run unpacked 
onions from Panike. The contract contained express specifications for the size and quality of the 
onions. Panike tendered onions that conformed to those contractual specifications. Four Rivers 
rejected Panike's tender of conforming onions, because Four Rivers believed it was entitled to 
utilize a field selection clause to obtain onions of much larger size than those contracted for. 
Since the market price for onions had increased beyond the contract price at the time of Four 
Rivers rejection of Panike's tender, Four Rivers sued Panike for $181,750.00, which was the 
alleged difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of the alleged 
breach. After a bench trial, the District Court held that Panike was in breach and Four Rivers 
was entitled to damages. The District Court found that, even though Four Rivers refixed to 
accept delivery of Panike's tender of onions that met or exceeded the size and quality 
specifications negotiated by the parties, Panike had breached the contract because the onions 
were not picked from the two fields requested by Four Rivers. The District Court found that 
Four Rivers was entitled to use the field selection clause, even at the end of the growing season, 
to choose fields containing onions that were significantly more valuable than ones that met the 
agreed-upon size and quality specifications. After incorrectly finding that Panike breached the 
contract, the District Court miscalculated the damages available under the Idaho Code. The 
Court awarded Four Rivers $311,250.00 in damages, well beyond the $181,750.00 Four Rivers 
requested at trial, forcing Panike to compensate Four Rivers for packed onions which Four 
Rivers did not contract for. 
11. PROCEEDINGS 
Judgment was entered on January 28,2008 in favor of Four Rivers in the amount of 
$31 1,250.00, with attorney's fees in the amount of $16,680.00 and costs in the amount of 
$1,194.79, for a total Judgment of $329,124.79. Appellant Panike filed a Notice of Appeal on 
March 7,2008, and an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 19,2008. Appellant's attorney 
David L. Cook was admitted to practice pro hac vice before this Court on August 8,2008. 
111. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Panike entered into two contracts with Four Rivers in January 2006 - one for onions from 
Panike's personal storage and one for onions from Panike's 2006 and 2007 onion crop. (TI. p. 
40, L. 18-25; p. 41, L. 8). Four Rivers was the drafter of the contracts and the contracts allowed 
for handwritten additions for specific contract terms such as quantity, commodity, and grade. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1; Tr. p. 42, L. 23 - p. 43, L. 2). The contract included express terms for the 
amount of onions, as well as the grade, size, and price. (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1; Tr. p. 44, L. 18 - 
p. 45, L. 24). Specifically, the contract was for 25,000 hundredweight of unpacked field run 
onions for $4.75 per hundredweight. Id. The size requirement was a 75% three-inch minimum 
onion, meaning that "75% of the onions by weight must meet the three-inch minimum size." 
(Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1; Tr. p. 45, L. 22-24). Generally, 3 - 3 %-inch minimum onions are 
considered "jumbos", while the term "colossal" is used for onions of 3 % - 4 !4 inches in 
diameter, and the term "super colossal" is used for the most valuable onions, those that measure 
4 i/q inches or larger in diameter. (Tr. p. 64, L. 5 - p. 65, L. 5). The contract also included a 
"field selection clause," which noted that "the buyer "will specify field(s)." (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 
1). The contract did not specify a variety of onion. (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1; Tr. p. 48, L. 3-7). 
On August 15,2006, seven months after the parties entered into the contract, Panike 
contacted Randy Smith, a neighbor and Four Rivers' general manager and field man, regarding a 
drain on Mr. Smith's property that was causing water to flood Panike's fields. (Tr. p. 136, L. 6- 
8; p. 50, L. 7-17; p. 157, L. 6-17). During this conversation, Mr. Smith informed Mr. Panike that 
Four Rivers intended to select the particular fields from which its onions should come. (Tr. p. 
51, L. 14-17; p. 157, L. 13-15). Panike refused to deliver onions from the fields requested by 
Mr. Smith because those fields contained onions that were of a different variety and were much 
larger than those specified in the contract. (Tr, p. 51, L. 19-20; p. 157, L. 16-17). According to 
the ongoing business relationship that Panike had with Appleton Produce, the onions from the 
fields mentioned by Mr. Smith were already committed to Appleton Produce. (Tr. p. 65, L. 14 - 
p. 66, L. 1). Moreover, the fields that Four Rivers specified contained better quality and larger 
onions (more colossal and super colossal onions), while Four Rivers had only contracted for 
jumbo onions that met the minimum quality requirements as specified in the contract. (Tr. p. 53, 
L. 22 -p. 54, L. 4; p. 81, L. 5-11; p. 88, L. 13 -p. 90, L. 17). Paaike believed that the exercise 
of the clause in the manner demanded by Mr. Smith was improper and contrary to his 
experience. (Tr. p. 33, L. 18 - p. 34, L. 2; p. 98, L. 17-18). Despite Mr. Smith's demands, 
Panike intended to deliver the onions he had contracted to deliver - 25,000 hundredwe~ght of 
field run onions for $4.75 per hundredweight of a 75% three-inch minimum size. (Tr. p. 52, L. 
3-7). 
On October 3,2006, Panike attempted to deliver to Four Rivers two loads of onions that 
met the contract specifications. (Tr. p. 57, L. 9-1 1). Upon Mr. Panike's arrival at Four Rivers, 
Janine Smith, a part owner of Four Rivers, refused to inspect the onions tendered by Panike. 
Instead, she merely asked Panike if the onions were from the fields specified by Mr. Smith. 
(Tr. p. 57, L. 9 - 24). After Panike informed her that they were not from the specified fields, 
Mrs. Smith rejected the conforming onions. (Tr. p. 57, L. 19-24). To ensure that the onions 
tendered to Four Rivers met the contract specifications, Panike hued a federally licensed state 
inspector employed by the Idaho Department of Agriculture to inspect the shipment. (Tr. p. 54, 
L. 12-15; p. 123, L. 4 -p. 125, L. 2; p. 132, L. 10 - 24). The inspector found that the onions 
were 89% three-inch and larger U.S. Number 1 onions, and thus far exceeded the contract 
specifications. (Tr. p. 60, L. 13-22; p. 132, L. 10). 
On October 3,2006, the market price for packed three-inch minimum onions was $18 per 
hundredweight. In addition, the market price to pack onions was $6 per hundredweight. (Tr. p. 
216, L. 22-25). 
Even before Four Rivers wrongfully rejected the onions tendered by Panike, Four Rivers 
had filed an agricultural products lien on September 29,2006 in Washington County, Idaho. 
Several months later, when the market price for packed three-inch minimum onions (jumbo 
variety) was much higher, in order to fill their resale contracts for larger onions, Four Rivers 
bought packed onions that included colossal and supercolossals, larger onions than what they 
contracted with Panike for, from two onion growers that Four Rivers had existing contracts with 
andlor entered into new contracts with for $22 and $24 per hundredweight. (Tr. p. 216, L. 19-25; 
p. 160, L. 6-10; p. 166, L. 19 -p. 167, L. 21). 
Four Rivers selected fields that contained onions of the best quality and best size because 
it needed such onions to meet its obligations in sales contracts with subsequent buyers. (Tr. p. 
51, L. 22-25; p. 157, L. 19-20; p. 177, L. 19 - p. 179, L. 6). Mr. Smith testified that Four Rivers 
exercised the field selection clause in order to obtain larger onions than what they contracted to 
purchase: 
Q. But why did you designate those specific fields? 
A. Those specific fields were designated for size was part of it, they had deeper colored 
skins, and they had good single-center quality."). 
(Tr. p. 154, L. 15-19). Indeed, Mr. Smith never challenged the fact that Panike's tendered onions 
met the contractual size and quality requirements. Mr. Smith's only complaint was that the 
onions tendered by Panike did not come out of the specified fields. (Tr. p. 177, L. 9-18; Tr. p. 
182, L. 22-p. 183, L. 9). Thus, Mr. Smith admitted that Four Rivers exercised the field selection 
clause in order to meet resale contracts that required large size and high quality requirements. 
As such, Four Rivers used the field selection clause to require Panike to provide onions of a 
different size, quality and variety than what the parties specifically bargained for and what the 
contract's express terms provided for. During the District Court proceedings, Mr. Smith testified 
that: 
Q. So you're telling the court that you contracted a size larger than what you're 
buying &om him? 
A. No. I'm telling the court that the field better fit my contracts on the other end. 
Q. Where does your contract .. . say that Mr. Panike's onions have to fit your 
contract with a third party on the other end. Where does it say that? 
A. They don't, but that's why we have the buyer will specify the onions, so that 
we get those onions. . . . 
Q. -you're trying to specify onion that meets your contract with thud party; is 
that what you're telling the court. 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. p. 178, L. 17 - p. 179, L. 10). Mr. Smith's testimony that he exercises the field selection 
clause based on the demands of his third-party contracts, and not on the specifications included 
in Four Rivers' contract with the grower, contradicts the practice of other packers' exercise of 
field selection clauses. As another packer, George Rodriguez, testified, the field selection clause 
is limited to the terms of the contract. Rodriguez noted that when he specifies the variety of 
onion in the contract, he exercises the field selection clause to select onions only eom fields with 
that variety. (Tr. p. 198, L. 18 -p. 199, L. 20). However, when no such specification is included 
in the contract, he does not exercise the field selection clause to designate fields. (Tr. p. 201, L. 
16-18). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the District Court err in finding that Respondent properly rejected the onions tendered by 
appellant? 
Did the Respondent breach its duty to deal in good faith when it attempted to use a field selection 
clause to obtain onions of a higher value than those specified in the contract? 
Did the District Court err by finding in favor of the Respondent when there was no competent 
evidence that the parties had a meeting of the minds necessary to form a valid, enforceable 
contract? 
Did the District Court err in its calculation of damages? 
Should the Appellant be awarded its reasonable attorney fees for the appeal, pursuant to Idaho 
Code 8 12-120(3)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court eeely reviews matters of law, including the District Court's interpretation of 
contracts. SE/Z Construction, L.L.C. v. Idaho State University, 140 Idaho 8, 12,89 P.3d 848, 
852 (2004). The findings of the District Court on damages should be set aside when not based 
upon substantial and competent evidence. Trilogy NetworkSys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 
ARGUMENT 
I. FOUR RIVERS WRONGFULLY REJECTED THE ONIONS PROVIDED BY 
PANIKE 
The District Court erred in holding that Panike breached the contract because Panike 
tendered onions that unquestionably conformed to the quality and size requirements of the 
contract. By focusing only on the field selection clause, the District Court and Four Rivers 
incorrectly applied the rule regarding delivery and rejection of conforming goods under the 
Idaho Code. The Court held that because Panike "attempted delivery of onions that did not come 
from fields 5 andfor 7, the onions did not conform to the terms of the contract and Four Rivers 
rightfully rejected the onions." (R. 108). The District Court held that onions from 
nondesignated fields would never conform because they would not be "in accordance with the 
obligations under the contract." Id. (citing I.C. 5 28-2-106). The District Court's interpretation 
creates an impossible situation for growers such as Panike, by allowing buyers to arbitrarily 
reject goods which meet contractual requirements, under the guise of a field selection clause. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1). 
The Court of Appeals has held that "[ilf the goods do not conform in kind, quality, 
condition, or amount they may be rejected." Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 149, 158,845 
P.2d 567, 570 (Ct. App. 1992). See also 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales 5 610, p. 901. In Figueroa, the 
Court of Appeals recognized that a buyer could reject when the seller failed to deliver a type of 
clay that met the contract specifications for permeability. Figueroa v. Kit-Sun Co., 123 Idaho at 
158, 845 P.2d at 570. Similarly, in Peck v. Nixon, 47 Idaho 675, 679,277 P. 11 12, 11 13 (1929), 
this Court held that the buyers "were required to take only [the type of steery contracted for and, 
in Baker v. LC. Watson Co., 64 Idaho 573,578,134 P.2d 613,615 (1943), this Court recognized 
the buyer's right to reject peaches that failed to meet the agreed upon grade, U.S. No. 1 ("[ilf the 
contract was for U.S. No. l's, appellant was required to accept only peaches of such grade"). 
The result is contrary to the dictates of the Idaho UCC, which only allows for rejection of 
goods that do not meet express quality or size requirements. Unlike in the above cases, the 
onions that Panike attempted to deliver to Four Rivers conformed to the contract in kind, quality, 
condition, and amount. See I.C. 5 28-2-106(2) ("Goods . . . are 'conforming' or conform to the 
contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract."). According to 
the terms of the contract, Four Rivers contracted for 75% three-inch minimum yellow onions. 
(R. 104). The District Court agreed that Panike tendered onions that exceeded the 75% 
minimum requirement and quality requirements (R. 106; Tr. p. 60, L. 15-21; p. 132, L. 7-1 1). 
Finally, it is undisputed Panike was prepared to deliver all of the agreed upon amount, 25,000 
hundredweight, to Four Rivers. (Tr. p. 57, L. 25 - p. 58, L. 7; p. 60, L. 1-21). 
When Panike attempted to deliver the onions to Four Rivers, Four Rivers did not even 
question whether the goods conformed in kind, quality, condition, or amount, nor did Four 
Rivers exercise their right to inspect the goods. (Tr. p. 57, L. 19-24); I.C. 6 28-2-513. Instead, 
when given the chance to inspect the onions delivered by Panike, Mrs. Smith simply asked if the 
onions were from the specified fields. (Tr. p. 57, L. 12-24). By failing to actually inspect the 
onions that Panike attempted to deliver, Four Rivers is prohibited from claiming the onions did 
not meet the kind, quality, condition or amount required under the contract -nor could they. As 
such, Four Rivers wrongfully rejected onions that met or exceeded every essential element of the 
contract - onions of the kind, quality, condition and amount that the parties agreed to in the 
written contract. 
The field selection clause should not be found to trump the quality and size 
specifications. Courts have recognized that contract provisions should be read in connection 
with the other clauses in the contract. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 193, 923 P.2d 434,438 
(1996) ("interpreting any provisions of a contract . . ., the entire agreement must be viewed as a 
whole") (citing St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702,705,769 P.2d 579, 582) (1989)); Yeremian 
v. Turlock Dehydrating &Packing Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 92,96 (3rd App. Div. 1938). In 
Yeremian, the court noted that a clause dictating the time for harvesting of a crop "did not give 
the shipper the right to arbitrarily refuse deliveries which met the requirements of the contract." 
30 Cal. App. 2d at 96 (the court noted that the interpretation urged by the defendant "would 
render the contract unreasonable and unf&, and its language does not require such 
interpretation."). Similarly, in this case, Four Rivers' field selections were a blatant attempt to 
obtain onions of much greater value than it bargained for. 
The District Court failed to interpret the field selection clause as being limited to the 
terms of the contract. Four Rivers' own witness, George Rodriguez, confirmed that, as a packer, 
he specifies the variety of onion that he requires under the contract and then, when exercising the 
field selection clause, he selects only from those fields containing that variety of onion. (Tr. p. 
198, L. 18 - p. 199, L. 20). Moreover, Mr. Rodriguez confirmed that when he does not specify 
the variety of onion in the contract, he does not designatefields. 
Q. Now, if you don't specify the variety, you don't go out and pick the fields . . . 
do you? 
A. No. 
(Tr. p. 201, L. 16-18). Mr. Rodriguez confirmed that the exercise of the field selection clause is 
limited to the terms of the contract. Here, because Four Rivers chose not to specify a variety, it 
was precluded from requiring onions of any size, quality or variety other than those that met the 
terms of the contract -onions that were 75% three-inch minimum field run onions. (Tr. p. 104, 
L. 18-23; Tr. p. 196,L. 14 - p. 197, L. 2) (Mr. Rodriguez testified that when he was in a prior 
dispute over a grower's performance under a field selection clause, Mr. Rodriguez, as the packer, 
eventually won the dispute because he specified a variety of onion in the contract). 
During the District Court proceedings, Four Rivers argued that it rejected the onions 
because it needed larger and higher quality onions to meet presold contracts with other buyers. 
(Tr. p. 155, L. 25 -p. 156, L. 6; p. 177, L, 19 - p. 179, L. 6). Not only are Four Rivers' presold 
contracts with subsequent buyers irrelevant to the express duties bargained for between Panike 
and Four Rivers, this argument fails because, as the drafter of the form contract, if Four Rivers 
wanted to ensure a specific size of onion &om Panike in order to manage and meet presold 
contracts, it could have contracted for a larger size onion, an onion of a higher quality, or a 
specific variety of onion. See also D.J. Carpenter v. C. P. Grogan, 18 Cal. App. 505, 508 (2nd 
App. Div. 1912) ("If the defendant expected to insist upon a certain standard of size, ripeness, or 
other quality, to be possessed by the fruit at the time it was delivered, then that matter should 
have been expressed in the written agreement of sale; otherwise the vender could not be bound 
by it."). 
The District Court erred by failing to find that Four Rivers' rejection was improper 
because the onions tendered by Panike conformed to the contract in kind, quality, condition, and 
amount and even exceeded the contract specifications for 75% three-inch minimum onions. The 
District Court's decision, if allowed to stand, could have devastating impacts on Idaho growers 
and the economic stability of the state's agricultural industry. Under the District Court's 
decision, growers would no longer enter into preseason contracts because they would be required 
to operate under the assumption that, at any time, a packer has the ability to demand onions that 
exceed the minimum requirements in an agreed-upon preseason contract. Panike tendered 
conforming goods and this Court should hold Four Rivers to the terms of their agreement. 
11. FOUR RIVERS ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN ONIONS OF A MUCH LARGER 
SIZE THAN THE PARTIES HAD BARGAINED FOR IN BREACH OF ITS 
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
A. Four Rivers Breached Their Express Duty of Good Faith by Utilizing the 
Field Selection Clause to Require Panike to Deliver Onions of a Larger Size 
Than The Parties Contracted For 
The District Court's erred in holding that Four Rivers' exercise of the field selection 
clause was'in good faith and withim the limits of commercial reasonableness. In reaching its 
decision, the District Court relied on Idaho Code 5 28-2-31 1, which states that a contract which 
is otherwise sufficiently definite is not made invalid by the fact that particulars of performance 
are to be specified by one of the parties. (R. 108); I.C. 5 28-2-3 1 l(1). However, the District 
Court failed to consider the remainder of that very same Code Section, which provides that "my 
such specification must be made in good faith and within limits set by commercial 
reasonableness." LC. 5 28-2-311(1). The Idaho Code defmes "good faith" as "honesty in fact in 
the conduct or transaction concerned." LC. 8 28-1-201(19). The comments to Section 28-2-31 1 
note that good faith must be exercised so that there is "no surprise."' Id. 
It was improper for the District Court to rely on I.C. 8 28-2-3 11, in finding Four Rivers 
had the "right to designate the fields fiom which their onions would come," while ignoring the 
section's good faith requirement. (R. 108). A reasonable analysis of Four Rivers' actions 
compels the conclusion that Four Rivers' after-the-fact field specification was in bad faith 
' The Supreme Court of Idaho has "fkequently considered the comments to the official text of 
the UCC and has given the comments substantial weight in determining the meaning of the 
statute." Walker v. American Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 829,948 P.2d 1123, 1128 
(1997) (citing Coer d' Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 818, 800 P.2d 
1026, 1032 (1990)). 
because it was a blatant attempt to obtain onions of a much larger size, and therefore greater 
value, than the parties contracted for. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that a covenant of good faith is violated when 
"action by either party . . . violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the . . . 
contract." Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622,627, 778 P.2d 744,749 (1989). 
Here, Four Rivers failed to exercise good faith by attempting to use the field selection clause to 
obtain Panike's largest onions -onions of a size that exceeded the required and agreed-upon 
contract size - for a drastically reduced price, thereby significantly reducing Panike's benefit 
under the contract. 
Four Rivers' own witnesses imply that onion packers cannot make a unilateral decision 
regarding the field selection. Floyd Johnson, an onion packer, testified that at the time of field 
selection, the field decision is not made by the packer alone but, instead, the packer and the 
grower "talk it over" and discuss the field selection before the fmal designation. (Tr. p. 206, L. 
19-22; p. 207, L. 20 - p. 208, L. 2). 
Finally, comment one to Idaho Code Section 28-2-31 1, notes that the duty of good faith 
and commercial reasonableness is required so as to not "surprise" a party to the contract. Here, 
Panike testified that he had an ongoing agreement with Appleton Produce to raise the same 
larger and better quality onions that Four Rivers attempted to designate just prior to harvest. (Tr. 
p. 82, L. 3-21; p. 51, L. 19-20; p. 157, L. 16-17). The term "ongoing" means that Mr. Panike had 
preseason discussions with Appleton Produce to discuss the variety of onion they wanted to 
purchase from him and then planted his fields accordingly. Logically, when Four Rivers 
attempted to designate fields that contained onions of a different variety and size than what 
Panike had contracted to provide to Four Rivers, Panike was surprised because he had already 
committed to supply the onions &om fields 5 andlor 7 to Appleton Produce. 
Panike tendered onions that met or exceeded the size and quality specifications 
negotiated by the parties. Instead of accepting the conforming goods, Four Rivers attempted to 
rely on the field selection clause as a way to obtain onions that were larger, and as even Four 
Rivers concedes, of a significantly greater value than the onions designated by the contract. 
Under these facts, an onion buyer's abuse of a field selection clause as against a grower 
constitutes a violation of the duty to act with good faith and commercial reasonableness required 
under Idaho Code Section 28-2-311(1). Four Rivers exercised the field selection clause in order 
to substantially increase its bargain and drastically reduce the benefit of the contract to Panike. 
The District Court's opinion contains no analysis of the duty of good faith and commercial 
reasonableness 
B. Four Rivers Attempted to Modify the Parties' Bargain By Exercising the 
Field Selection Clause to Obtain Onions of a Different Sue Than The Parties 
Bargained For 
Based on Four Rivers' own testimony that it was always their intention to utilize the field 
selection clause to obtain onions of a greater size and value than Panike contracted to provide, 
there was no meeting of the minds at the contract's formation and thus the contract at issue was 
never formed. In addition, the District Court's interpretation of the contract allowed Four Rivers 
to modify the express terms of the contract by utilizing the field selection clause to demand 
onions that contradicted the terms of the parties' agreement. 
1. There was No Meeting of the Minds at the Formation of the Contract and 
No Contract was Formed Because 11 Was Four Rivers' Intention to i.'tilize 
the Field Selection Clause ro Obtain Onions of a Greater Size and Value 
than Panike Contracted to Provide 
Parties to a contract must have a "mutual understanding or meeting of the minds 
regarding essential contract terms in order for the contract to be binding." Figueroa, 123 Idaho 
at 156,845 P.2d at 570 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353,796 P.2d 
1026 (Ct. App. 1990)); GulfChem. Employees Fed Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 
893,693 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Ct. App. 1984) ("It long has been settled that no enforceable contract 
exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds and embodies a distinct understanding common to 
both parties. The contract must be specific enough to show that the parties shared a mutual 
intent.") (internal citations omitted); 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales 8 129, p. 398 (1985)). Although both 
parties intended to enter into a contract, Panike testified that he believed that any designation of 
fields was to take place when the contract is signed. (Tr. p. 86, L. 13-18). In addition, Panike 
did not remember seeing the field selection clause in the contract when the parties discussed the 
terms of the contract. (Tr. p. 98, L. 17-18). Thus, Panike entered into the contract with Four 
Rivers with the sole understanding that he had agreed to provide 25,000 hundredweight of 75% 
three-inch minimum field run onions. (Tr. p. 44, L. 18 - p. 48, L. 7). 
Mr. Smith does not deny that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties 
when they entered into the contract because, at the time the contract was formed, although Four 
Rivers and Panike contracted for a specific size and quality of onion, Four Rivers had every 
intention of selecting onions of any size and quality that were contained in their resale contracts 
with other buyers. 
Q. So you say by preseason you put in buyer will specify fields allows you an 
open book without ever a meeting of the minds between the parties; is that 
correct? 
A. What it gives me is it ensures the quality, the size, the color, the produce - I  
mean the product that we are receiving. On a product that is contracted in 
September or later, that crop has already been grown, it's already lying in the 
field, we can take a look at it, we can see the size, we can see the color, we 
can see the quality. 
(Tr. p. 181, L. 5-15). 
In the District Court proceedings, Four Rivers advanced the argument that it had 
unfettered. discretion regarding which field to designate, notwithstanding the express contract 
terms regarding size and quality. (Tr. p. 180, L. 13-18) ("Q. So you think that - your position is 
that you can do whatever you want afterwards as far as designate? A. As far as designating 
fields."). Thus, there was no meeting of the minds and no contract was formed. As such, Panike 
was not required to deliver any goods to Four Rivers and Four Rivers is prohibited from claiming 
damages because contract formation never actually occurred. 
2. Four Rivers Attempted to Modifv the Parties' Contract Without Panike's 
Agreement 
According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary aim in interpreting all contracts is to 
ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract was made." USA Fertilizer, Inc. 
v. Idaho First National Bank, 120 Idaho 271,273,815 P.2d 469,471 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis 
added). Under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Idaho, additional terms to a 
contract, terms different from those offered or agreed upon, are "to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract." I.C. 5 28-2-207. Moreover, "such [additional] tenns will become part 
of the contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they 
materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given 
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received." LC. 5 28-2-207(2) (emphasis added). 
See also Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1350, 1356 
W.D. Ind. 1989) ('9.C. § 28-2-207(20)(c) states that the additional terms do not become part of 
the contract if the offeror notifies the offerree of his object to the additional terms within a 
reasonable time."). In addition, although an "agreement modifying a contract needs no 
consideration to be binding," LC. 5 28-2-209 first contemplates an "agreement." Thus, this 
Court has held that a "seller's unilateral attempts at modification are ineffective because, in such 
cases, the buyer has 'agreed' to nothing." DuBn v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 
1002, 1012,895 P.2d 1195,1205 (1995). 
Additional or different terms will not become part of an agreement if they materially alter 
the original bargain. Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 123 Idaho 149,845 P.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1992). In 
Figueroa, the court held that where additional terms in a written contract that purported to 
confiurn the parties' prior oral agreement materially altered the terms of the agreement because 
the additional t e r n  affected the price, schedule or payment, who to pay, and the risk of loss 
during delivery, the contradicting terms would not become part of the formal agreement. Id. at 
157,845 P.2d at 570. 
Here, it is undisputed that the parties agreed to contract for 25,000 hundredweight of 75% 
three-inch minimum onions. (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1). Mr. Panike was not aware that the field 
selection clause was in the contract. (Tr. p. 98, L. 17 ) ("... I do not remember those specific 
words"). Furthermore, at the time the contract was made, Panike did not agree to provide onions 
of a larger size than that required by the express terms of the contract for the same price as the 
75% three-inch minimum onions he contracted to sell to Four Rivers. In this case, as in DuBn, 
because Panike as the seller did not agree to the modification proposed by Four Rivers -the 
parties "agreed" to nothing and the District Court should have held Four Rivers' unilateral 
attempt to modifl a material aspect of the contract (the size of goods to he delivered) to have 
been ineffective. 
The "confumatory letter" sent by Mr. Smith to Panike on August 25,2006 claimed to 
designate the fields from which the onions contracted for must be delivered from. (R. 142). 
However, since Panike had agreed to provide onions that met the contract standards - 75% three- 
inch minimum onions - and the onions in the selected fields were significantly larger and of a 
greater value, the "confirmatory letter" was outside the terms of the parties' agreement and was 
an attempt by Four Rivers to materially alter the original bargain. See D.R. Curtis Co. v. Mason, 
103 Idaho 476,478,649 P.2d 1232,1234 (Ct. App. 1982) ("[nlo language in a 'confirming 
memorandum' can create an agreement that did not previously exist."). Moreover, Mr. Panike 
immediately gave verbal and written notification to Four Rivers that its attempt to modify the 
contract was rejected. (Tr. p. 51, L. 14 - p. 52, L. 20). As such, Four Rivers' attempt to 
materially alter the original terms of the agreement was ineffective. 
Furthermore, as the drafter of the form contract, Four Rivers had the ability to draft the 
initial contract to require a greater percentage of three-inch onions, to have specified a certain 
type or size of onion that would have yielded a larger product (such as colossal or super colossal 
onions), or included a provision that provided for an increase in payment to Panike according to 
the size of onion delivered to Four Rivers. Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 816, 118 
P.3d 141, 148 (2005) ("Court should construe the conflicting provisions against . .. the drafter of 
the agreement). Mr. Panike testified that fields selected by Four Rivers contained higher quality 
and larger onions, onions of a size between 3 % inches and 4 '/4 inches or larger in diameter - 
certainly larger than the "75% three-inch minimumMM onion that Four Rivers and Panike expressly 
bargained for. (Tr. p. 51, L. 19-20; p. 157, L. 16-17; Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1). 
Four Rivers' use of the field selection clause was a thinly veiled attempt to obtain 
something for nothing. Panike agreed to contract with Four Rivers for 25,000 hundredweight of 
75% three-inch m i n i m  onions and that was exactly the goods Panike attempted to deliver on 
October 3,2006. Panike never agreed to provide onions of a size larger than the 75% three-inch 
minimum onions that the parties bargained for. By its use of the field selection clause, Four 
Rivers attempted to modify the express terms of the agreement by requiring Panike to provide a 
much larger onion than was required by the contract. As such, the District Court erred by 
allowing the field selection clause to supersede every specific term of the parties' previously 
agreed-upon contract. 
Moreover, although a Four Rivers representative claimed that the field selection clause 
could also be utilized to address quality issues under certain circumstances, this argument fails 
because the qnality requirements of the contract are explicitly stated in the contract. (Plaintiffs 
Trial Ex. 1 7 2) ("The contract onions that have excessive tops, seeders, sun scald, neck rot, or 
butt rot, will be state inspected at Grower's expense. Excessive defects is defined as 10% or 
more. The average percent of defects will he deducted from the CWT price at the rate of one 
cent for each percentage point of defect."). It is undisputed that Four Rivers was the drafter of 
the contract, and chose not to specify a size greater than 75% three-inch minimum onions. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1). Moreover, although Mr. Smith claims he was concerned about the 
onions' quality, there were quality provisions included by Four Rivers in the contract's express 
terms that would have addressed any concerns Four Rivers had about the quality of the tendered 
onions. (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1 77 1,2,3, 11). Had Four Rivers sought a higher quality product, 
the contract should provide for such (and paid Panike accordiigly). 
111. EVEN IF PANIKE DID BREACH THE CONTRACT, THE DISTRICT COURT 
E W D  ZN CALCULATING DAMAGES 
Even if this Court finds that Panike breached the contract because he did not provide 
onions from the fields requested by Four Rivers, the District Court's damages calculation is 
clearly erroneous and must be overturned. Chiefly, the District Court erred in its calculation of 
damages by adding the cost of packing to the market price of packed onions when it should have 
subtracted the cost of packing to anive at the market price for unpacked onions. The contract 
clearly states that Four Rivers was only entitled to receive unpacked onions frompanike. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1 7 4). Notably, during the trial, Four Rivers admitted that it sought 
damages only reflecting the cost of unpacked onions. The District Court's error forced Panike to 
compensate Four Rivers for something Four Rivers did not bargain for, and thus provided Four 
Rivers with a large windfall. 
Presumably because Four Rivers did not effect "cover" purchases within a reasonable 
time, it sought damages as measured by Idaho Code 28-2-713(1): "the difference between the 
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together 
with any incidental and consequential damages . . . but less any expenses saved in consequence 
of the seller's breach." LC. 3 28-2-713(1). It is well settled that the market price mentioned in 
Idaho Code 28-2-713(1) refers to goods "of the same kind." Keller v. Inland Metals All Weather 
Conditioning, Inc., 139 Idaho 233,239 (Idaho 2003). The contract makes perfectly clear that 
"the onions will be packed at Four Rivers Packing, Inc., Weiser, Idaho." (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1 
7 4). By calculating the market price of the contracted for onions to include the cost of packing, 
the District Court allowed Four Rivers to collect damages for more expensive goods than were 
called for in the contract. Such a calculation is clearly not supportable under Idaho law. See id. 
at 240 (finding that cover damages are not available for the purchase of "more expensive goods 
than the ones called for by the original contract"). 
The appropriate damages calculation under these circumstances is quite simple and was 
clearly spelled out by Four Rivers' own witnesses at trial. During direct examination, Randy 
Smith, the manager of Four Rivers, stated that he believed the contract was breached on or about 
October 3,2006, the date when Four Rivers rejected Mr. Panike's delivery of  onion^.^ The 
District Court credited Janice Smith's testimony that the market price ofpacked three-inch 
minimum yellow onions on October 3,2006 was $18 per hundredweight. (R. 109). As 
Ms. Smith testified: 
Q. At the outset I advised the court that we were talking about damages of 
approximately $180,000. Do you know how we acquired that figure? 
A. If you look at the Market News Report ... on that date, the Market News price 
for a jumbo onion was $9 -or nine and a half. You double that to get to a 
hundredweight, you're at $18, less the $6 per hundred packing cost, for a net 
of 12. And his contract amount was $4.75. 
So if you take $12 minus the $4.75, you end up with 7.25 per hundredweight, 
and that replacement cost based on Market News on October 3 would have 
been $181,250. 
(Tr. p. 216, L. 16 - p. 2 17, L. 5). Randy Smith also admitted that any damages should be 
calculated using $12 as the market price of unpacked onions. (Tr. p. 171, L. 21-24) ("the amount 
that we're asking for was based off of the onion market on October 2nd and 3rd, which would 
equate to about $12 per hundredweight"). Notably, $12 per hundredweight was also the value 
Four Rivers used as an estimate when filing their lien. (Tr. p. 188, L. 1-6). 
By adding the cost of packing to the market price of packed onions when it should have 
subtracted the cost of packing to anive at the market price for unpacked onions, the District 
Court provided Four Rivers with far more than it bargained for. 
2 Notably, this testimony is contradicted by the fact that Four Rivers exercised the lien on 
September 28. The lien was available for recovery of damages sustained "by reason of any 
default or breach." (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1 7 9). The witnesses for Four Rivers never 
attempted to explain why they exercised the lien on September 28,2006, if, in their opinion, 
Panike didn't breach until October 3,2006. In any event, there is competent evidence in the 
record of the market price of packed onions on October 3,2006, and Mr. Panike is willing to 
agree that, if there was a breach, it occurred on that date. 
That Four Rivers paid a higher price for onions months later is irre~evant.~ First, Randy 
Smith conceded that it was seeking only damages based on the difference between the $12 per 
hundredweight market price on October 3,2006 and the contract price. (Tr. p. 171, L. 21-24). 
Second, Idaho Code Section 28-2-712 requires that any purchase to cover be made "without 
unreasonable delay." However, Four Rivers entered into its alleged cover contracts over three 
and five months aRer the date that Four Rivers claims to be the date of breach. (See Defendant's 
Trial Ex. H, I). This delay alone would prevent Four Rivers from claiming damages for its cost 
to cover. Third, the record contains no evidence that the onions Four Rivers purchased for 
alleged cover were of the same size and quality as the onions that these were purchased to 
replace. Instead, Randy Smith admitted that the onions that Four Rivers later purchased for 
cover were much larger than those called for by the original contract with Panike. (Tr. p. 188, L. 
7 - p. 189, L. 13 (referring to super colossal and colossals); see also Defendant's Trial Ex. H, I). 
Therefore, Panike respectfully requests that this Court reverse the finding of the district 
court as to the damages due to Four Rivers and award a maximum of $181,250.00 less the offsets 
discussed below. 
A. Even If Panike Did Breach the Contract, Amounts Previously Taken by 
Four Rivers Should Have Been Applied to Offset Damages 
At trial, Mr. Panike gave uncontroverted testimony that approximately $2,800.00 of 
Panike's money was still being held by Four Rivers. (Tr. p. 68, L. 2-12). Mr. Panike received a 
check from Weiser Feed and Storage as payment for some of Panike's wheat, but, because ofthe 
The district court was correct, however, when it found that, had Four Rivers experienced a 
cost savings when purchasing replacement onions, such savings should have been subtracted 
in its calculation of damages. (See R. 110). That did not happen here because Four Rivers 
waited until months later, when the market price had risen, to purchase additional onions. 
(See Defendant's Trial Ex. H, I). 
lien, the check was written to the order of Four Rivers. Id. Panike's counsel presented this 
check to counsel for Four Rivers, but payment on this check was never received. Id. The 
District Court did not address this in its damages calculation. By failing to give Panike credit for 
this offset, the trial court tinther erred in its calculation of damages. 
B. Panike Is Entitled to Damages for Wrongful Exercise of the Lien 
Four Rivers exercised an agricultural lien against Panike on September 28,2006. As 
established above, Panike was never in breach of his contract with Four Rivers. Thus, Four 
Rivers' exercise of the lien was improper and Panike is entitled to damages. 
However, even if this Court a f f m s  the District Court's finding that Panike breached the 
contract, Panike is entitled to damages because Four Rivers filed the lien before it alleges Panike 
breached. Four Rivers exercised the lien under Clause 9 of the contract on September 28,2006. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1 7 9). Randy Smith, however, testified that he did not consider Panike to 
have breached until Four Rivers rejected Panike's delivery of onions on October 3,2006. (Tr. p. 
159, L. 15-21). During this period, Four Rivers was in violation of the express terms of the 
contract. (See Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 1 7 9 ("Grower hereby gives Buyer a lien . . for any damages 
sustained by Buyer by reason of any default or breach by Grower."). Panike established that 
over $140,000 in receivables were delayed because of this improper lien, forcing Panike to delay 
$140,000 in paying down an operating loan for 60 days. (TI. p. 67, L. 4-16). Thus, Panike was 
charged 9% interest per annum on the loan over 60 days, for a total damage of $2,100.00. 
Because Panike presented uncontroverted evidence of the damages he sustained as a result of this 
wrongful exercise of the lien, the district court erred by failing to award Panike, at the very least, 
an offset in damages in the amount of $2,100.00. 
IV. FOUR RIVERS IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Under Idaho Code Section 12-120, the prevailing party in a dispute over a commercial 
transaction is entitled to attorney's fees. Here, Panike has established that the District Court 
erred in ruling that Panike breachea his contract with Four Rivers. Thus, it is Panike who is 
entitled to attorney's fees because he is the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
Judgment of the District Court and fmd that Appellant did not breach his contract with 
Respondent because he tendered goods which conformed to contractual requirements. Appellant 
also requests that the Court award him damages in the amount of $4,900.00. In the alternative, 
Appellant requests that the Court reverse the damages award by the District Court and award 
Respondent no more than $181,250.00 less the $4,900.00 in proven damages established by 
Panike. Appellant respectfully requests oral argument. 
Respectfully submitted the / day of October, 2008. 
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